

## *The Powell Amendment Voting Cycle: An Obituary*

The adoption of the Powell amendment on a bill to provide federal aid to education in 1956 is the most widely cited instance of a voting cycle in the U.S. House of Representatives. This article shows, however, that it was not a voting cycle and that the adoption of the Powell amendment was not responsible for the bill's defeat. Using evidence of members' preferences derived from their votes on similar measures the next year, I show that the status quo of not passing a bill would have defeated both the original bill and the amended bill.

Despite the fascination that voting cycles hold for social scientists, disappointingly few have been observed and documented in real-life legislatures. In fact, the already small set of known empirical examples of these phenomena is even smaller than previously imagined because the notorious adoption of the Powell antidiscrimination amendment in debate over federal aid to education legislation in 1956—by far the most commonly cited instance of a voting cycle—was not a voting cycle at all. This article demonstrates that there was no voting cycle and that the adoption of the Powell amendment did not contribute to the bill's defeat.

The Powell amendment might be called *a* textbook example of a voting cycle, but the awkward truth is that it is *the* textbook example. Although some theorists posit that democracy is inherently unstable, there is an embarrassing paucity of instances of documented instability.<sup>1</sup> Insofar as scholars seek to demonstrate that the theoretical possibility of a voting cycle has practical application, they rely on the Powell amendment. Riker wrote about it by himself three times (Riker 1965, 1982, 1986) and once more with coauthors (Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle 1985). Others have also written about the amendment, among them Enelow (1981), Brams (1985), Ordeshook (1986), and Shepsle and Bonchek (1997). Most recently, Stewart (2001) subjected it to extensive analysis in his textbook. Throughout this literature, it is either assumed or argued that the adoption of the Powell amendment doomed the

education bill.<sup>2</sup> Krehbiel and Rivers note that although the Powell amendment “is only one among thousands of roll calls taken in the history of Congress, it constitutes a large fraction of the evidence of sophisticated voting in legislatures” (1990, 549).

Virtually all discussions of the Powell amendment have relied on a flawed empirical demonstration by Riker that the defeat of the aid to education bill in 1956 resulted from the existence of a voting cycle. Riker (1965) contended that adding the Powell amendment to the bill cost it votes and that the original bill would have passed on its own. Riker’s demonstration was erroneous because, while he documented the votes lost by adding the antidiscrimination amendment, he *ignored votes that would have been lost had the antidiscrimination language not been included*. Correct calculation of the 1956 vote on aid to education shows that the bill would have lost either with or without the Powell amendment. Green and Shapiro document similar empirical problems in Riker’s supposed demonstration that a voting cycle delayed enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution (Green and Shapiro 1994, 109–10).

Discussion of the Powell amendment has centered on two theoretical possibilities—first, that it was a true case of a voting cycle in which the actual preferences of members of the House exhibited intransitivity and, second, that opponents of the education bill “contrived” a cycle through sophisticated voting. At various times Riker argued both possibilities. Enelow (1981) argues that there was no voting cycle but that clever Republicans used the Powell amendment as a “killer amendment” to doom a bill that otherwise would have passed. Shepsle and Bonchek (1997) cite it as an example of sophisticated voting. Krehbiel and Rivers (1990) convincingly demolish one theoretical possibility, showing that there was little or no identifiable sophisticated voting. They show that the Republicans who voted for the Powell amendment, and then against the bill, were voting sincerely both times. There may have been a few sophisticated votes, but not many. This evidence, however, still leaves open the possibility that there was a voting cycle.

The voting-cycle interpretation of the Powell amendment episode holds that: 1) In House consideration of a federal aid to education bill, the Powell antidiscrimination amendment was adopted (in other words, the amended bill beat the original bill); 2) on the vote for final passage, the status quo of passing no bill beat the amended bill when Southern Democrats, put off by the Powell amendment, joined Republicans in opposition; but 3) the original bill with no Powell amendment would have won with support from Northern and Southern Democrats, if paired against the status quo.

If this depiction of voting and preferences is correct, there was a voting cycle and the collective preferences of the House were intransitive. The first two of the three claims are demonstrated by actual votes in the House of Representatives in 1956. The third claim, that the original bill would have beaten the status quo, is absolutely vital to any argument that there was a voting cycle. But this claim must be assumed or demonstrated indirectly because in 1956 Congress did not vote on the original bill against the status quo. This article establishes that the status quo would have beaten the original bill in a head-to-head vote, proving that there was no voting cycle.

### History and Interpretations of the Powell Amendment

A brief recap of events leading to the defeat of the aid to education legislation will be helpful. In 1956, the House Education and Labor Committee reported a bill to provide states with federal financing to help build elementary and secondary schools. During consideration of the bill in the Committee of the Whole, Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) offered an amendment to forbid the distribution of funds to states that discriminated by race in their public schools.<sup>3</sup> The amendment passed on a teller vote of 164–116. Upon completion of debate and amending activity, the Committee of the Whole reported the bill to the House itself, which confirmed the Powell amendment by a roll-call vote of 225–192.<sup>4</sup> The bill, as amended, was then voted upon and defeated by a vote of 194–224 (Munger and Fenno 1962; Sundquist 1968). Republicans and Northern Democrats voted for the Powell amendment, while Southern Democrats were opposed. On the vote for final passage, most Republicans joined Southern Democrats in voting against, while Northern Democrats and a sizable minority of Republicans voted in favor.

The interpretation at the time and ever since has been that the adoption of the Powell amendment killed the bill by forcing the Southern Democrats to vote against legislation they otherwise would have supported.<sup>5</sup> Just as widely accepted is the idea that clever strategy by the Republicans, 97 of whom voted for the amendment but against final passage of the bill, was responsible for setting up a final vote that pitted the amended bill, rather than the original bill, against the status quo. Many observers have theorized that the original bill would have prevailed in a vote against the status quo. Such a belief presumes that Southern Democrats would have voted for the bill, provided the money came with no inconvenient antidiscrimination provisions, and proceeds from the assumption that Southern Democrats would vote their

districts' economic interests. Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle, for example, assume that "for Southern Democrats, the unamended bill was attractive because it would doubtless bring more money into their districts than it would take out" (1985, 1121). Riker (1986) assumes the same. By contrast, Riker (1965) does not argue that Southern Democrats would have uniformly voted for the original bill, but that enough of them would have done so to give it a bare majority over the status quo.

### Aid to Education in 1957

A test of these assertions would be impossible but for the fact that in 1957 the House considered identical aid to education legislation. In 1957, a recorded vote did pit the original bill against the status quo, and it provides the information needed to make reasonable inferences about whether or not the original bill would have passed in 1956. Forming these inferences requires a careful examination of votes and amendments.

Two amendments to the aid to education legislation, both offered in 1956 and 1957, are important for our purposes. One was the Powell amendment, and the other was an effort by Republicans in the House to substitute the Eisenhower administration's preferred legislation for the committee bill. President Eisenhower had three objections to the committee bill: (1) it did not concentrate enough money on poorer states, (2) the level of funding was too high, and (3) the duration of the authorization was too long. In 1956, Samuel McConnell (R-PA) offered a motion to recommit the bill to committee with instructions to substitute the administration bill. The motion was defeated on what was mostly a party-line roll-call vote, 158-262.

In 1957, the Education and Labor Committee reported a bill with many of the same provisions as before, which evoked the same objections from Eisenhower. Powell himself was absent when the bill came to the floor. In his absence, Stuyvesant Wainwright (R-NY), who had voted for the Powell amendment in 1956 and then against the bill on final passage, offered an antidiscrimination amendment, which passed on a teller vote, 136-105.<sup>6</sup> To many participants, the success of the Wainwright amendment seemed to destroy any chance of passing the bill.

At this juncture, William Ayres (R-Ohio) offered the administration proposal as a substitute for the committee bill. "What this amendment does," he explained, "is strike out title I and insert the identical bill that the administration proposed through Congressman McConnell in the last session of Congress" (*Congressional Record*

1957, 12750). Since this amendment would replace the entire first title as it existed at that time, it would eliminate the Wainwright/Powell amendment. After some discussion, it became clear that no one intended to offer an antidiscrimination amendment to the Ayres amendment. Republicans who had voted against school aid in 1956 stepped forward to praise Ayres and endorse his amendment. A leader of the minority, Charles Halleck (R-IN) said: "I commend the gentleman from Ohio for offering this substitute. It is President Eisenhower's program. I voted for it last year and I shall support the substitute this year" (Bendiner 1964, 136).

Next, liberal Democrats who had opposed the identical McConnell motion in 1956 decided that the Ayres amendment was the only way to get school construction legislation, and they too endorsed it. With support from liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans, and no Powell amendment to get in the way, the Ayres amendment and the bill momentarily seemed sure to pass.

But the bill's fortunes fell as quickly as they had risen. The support from conservative Republicans turned out to be hollow posturing. Conservative Republicans appear to have voiced support for the Ayres amendment in confident expectation that the Democrats would again refuse to accept a compromise, as they had in 1956 (Bendiner 1964). Their play allowed them to appear in support of aid to education without having to pass a bill.<sup>7</sup> But unexpected flexibility by the Democrats forced the Republicans to beat a hasty and embarrassing retreat. Halleck, who minutes before had praised the Ayres amendment when he thought it had no chance of passing, conferred with Howard Smith (D-VA), a leader of Southern Democrats, and together they decided on a strategy to kill the bill (Bendiner 1964, 137; Scheele 1966, 178-79; Sundquist 1968). Smith moved to strike the enacting clause, a parliamentary tactic described as "a rough and ungentle form of execution" (Tiefer 1989, 398-99). This motion offered members a choice between the status quo of no bill and the administration proposal without the Powell amendment. The status quo won, and the Ayres amendment lost 208-203.

### The Original Bill against the Status Quo

By comparing members' votes on final passage in 1956 and the motion to strike the enacting clause in 1957, we can ascertain whether or not, and to what extent, adoption of the Powell amendment cost the school construction bill votes in 1956. Riker (1965) also employed this method.

First, we can test the implicit argument of Riker (1986) and Denzau, Riker, and Shepsle (1985) that the Southern Democrats voted against the bill in 1956 because of the adoption of the Powell amendment. In 1956, all representatives from 10 Southern states voted against the bill.<sup>8</sup> In 1957, 79 of 88 Southerners voted to kill the education bill, even though it included no Powell amendment.<sup>9</sup> This pattern demonstrates that Southern Democrats overwhelmingly opposed federal aid to education, even though it would have been a net benefit to their states.<sup>10</sup> This fact is an important strike against the conventional view.

Few Southern Democratic votes were attracted by the deletion of the Powell amendment, but it is possible that its elimination would have won enough votes to allow the bill to pass in 1956. Riker (1965) makes this claim and tests it with data from 1957 in what has been the most rigorous effort to show that the original bill would have beaten the status quo. Twenty-three members of the House switched from opposition in 1956 to support in 1957 (see Table 1). Riker shows that eighteen of these members voted against both the Powell amendment and the bill in 1956 and then voted not to kill the bill in 1957. He contends that these votes, belonging mostly to Southern Democrats, were lost in 1956 because of the Powell amendment. He argues that these eighteen votes would have converted a losing vote of 199–227 into a winning vote of 217–209.<sup>11</sup>

There is a problem, however, in this reasoning. Riker considers only those members who switched from opposition in 1956 to support in 1957, ignoring switchers who went the other way. That is, he counts the votes that were *won* by deleting the Powell amendment but not the votes that were *lost*. Just as some members would vote for the bill only without the Powell amendment, others might vote for it only if it included antidiscrimination language. The latter describes Powell, as attested by his speech in the 1956 debate: "Negro people have waited many, many years for this hour of democracy to come and they are willing to wait a few more years rather than see this bill passed which will appropriate federal funds to build a dual system of Jim Crow schools in defiance of the law" (Sundquist 1968, 165–66).

Riker also neglected the possibility that some of the Republicans who voted for the bill on final passage in 1956 did not really want it to pass—they only wanted to give the *appearance* of supporting the bill. They voted for it only because they were sure it would be defeated. Had the Powell amendment been deleted and the bill come close to passing, they would have shifted their votes to nay.

It is important to calculate accurately and conservatively how many votes would have been lost due to the deletion of the Powell

TABLE 1  
Support for Aid to Education Legislation in 1956 and 1957

Vote on passage in 1956	Vote to Strike Enacting Clause in 1957	
	<i>Not Strike</i>	<i>Strike</i>
<i>Yea</i>	159	19
<i>Nay</i>	23	176

*Note:* Only members who participated in both votes are included.

amendment. Table 1 compares members' votes on final passage in 1956 with their votes on the motion to kill the bill in 1957 and gauges their sensitivity to changes in the bill from one year to the next. The vast majority of members voted the same in both years, suggesting that they were either strongly for or strongly against aid to education, and neither the Powell amendment nor the substitution of the administration bill for the committee bill affected their positions.

There were two important groups of switchers. "Positive switchers" are those representatives who changed their position from opposition in 1956 to support in 1957, 18 of whom Riker identified as probably having switched because of the Powell amendment. "Negative switchers" are the 19 members who supported the bill in 1956 but voted to kill it in 1957. Some will have preferred no bill to one without the Powell amendment. Others may have switched because they were only posturing in voting for the bill in 1956, trusting it would not pass, and when it had a real chance of passing in 1957, they voted their true preference. Some may have switched because they preferred no bill to the administration bill.

Fortunately, an analysis of votes on the Powell amendment and McConnell motion in 1956 allows us to distinguish those members most likely to have switched because of the deletion of the Powell amendment.

Negative switchers who voted for both the McConnell motion and the Powell amendment in 1956, and who voted to pass the bill in 1956, probably voted to kill the 1957 bill because it lacked antidiscrimination protections or because their support for the bill in 1956 was insincere. Since they voted for the McConnell motion and the committee bill in 1956, it is implausible that they would have voted to kill the bill the next year because of objections to the Ayres amendment, which was identical to the McConnell motion. Six Republicans

TABLE 2  
Identifying Vote Switches Due to Deletion  
of the Powell Amendment

	1956		1957		Number Switching
	Powell Amendment	McConnell Amendment	Passage	Strike Enacting Clause	
Switch to Support	N	Y or N	N	N	18
Switch to Oppose	Y	Y	Y	Y	6

fit into this category, and their votes should be considered a solid, minimum core of votes that, along with Powell's, comprise seven votes that would have been lost if the Powell amendment had not been passed in 1956. Table 2 shows the pattern of voting on motions and amendments by which Riker identified the votes won and the pattern I have used to identify the votes lost, by deleting the Powell amendment.

Given these six negative switchers, it is difficult or impossible to distinguish between those who were repelled in 1957 by the lack of antidiscrimination protections and those whose support in 1956 was insincere. We can ascertain something from the civil rights records of the six Republicans. There were four other civil rights roll-call votes in 1956 and 1957, and all six of these representatives took the pro-civil rights position on all four. This fact does not prove that they switched their votes because of the absence of the Powell amendment, but their civil rights records certainly lend support to that notion. For purposes of determining whether or not the Powell amendment was a true voting cycle, it does not matter whether these six switched their votes because of the absence of the Powell amendment or because their support in 1956 was insincere. With or without the Powell amendment, these votes were opposed to the final bill.

In calculating how the 1956 vote on final passage would have turned out had the Powell amendment not passed, the votes of these six Republicans, plus Powell's, must be subtracted from the "yea" column and added to the "nays." It is reasonable to assume that these seven votes would have been lost had the Powell amendment not passed. A correct calculation of the vote begins with the 199 original yea votes, subtracts seven votes that would have been lost by deleting the Powell amendment, and adds the eighteen votes that Riker shows would probably have been won by deleting the Powell amendment.

TABLE 3  
Estimating the Vote for Aid to Education  
without the Powell Amendment

	Actual Votes for Passage in 1956	+	Votes Won by Deleting Powell	-	Votes Lost by Deleting Powell	=	Estimated Vote for Passage
Riker's 1965 Calculation	199	+	18	-	0	=	217
Corrected Calculation	199	+	18	-	7	=	210

Without the Powell amendment, the bill loses to the status quo by a vote of 210-216. Table 3 shows both Riker's method of calculating the 1956 vote and the corrected calculation described above.

#### Accounting for Missing Voters

The foregoing demonstration undermines Riker's evidence of a voting cycle in 1956. But a weakness in both his research and my refutation is that they are based only on those individuals who were members in both the 84th and 85th Houses and voted on both occasions. Fifty-seven members of the 84th House either did not return to the 85th or did not vote on the motion to strike the enacting clause. It is possible that some of these members voted against the bill in 1956 because of the Powell amendment, and thus, excluding them from the comparison might disguise a true voting cycle.

The 57 nonvoters are not, however, a distinct group compared to the House as a whole, so it is unlikely that their failure to vote disguises a true voting cycle.<sup>12</sup> A more careful analysis of possible bias due to this nonvoting should focus on the members who could actually contribute to a voting cycle—those who in 1956 voted against the Powell amendment and against the bill on final passage and who failed to vote in 1957. Of the 57, 13 voted against the Powell amendment and against the bill on final passage in 1956, as the positive switchers did.<sup>13</sup> They might have voted against the bill because of the Powell amendment, but we do not have their votes in 1957 to find out how they would have voted on the education bill without Powell. But we can use NOMINATE voting scores to identify the voting habits of these

members, compare them to other representatives who did vote in 1957, and make some inferences as to how they might have voted on the education bill without the Powell amendment.

The crucial subset for comparison is the 116 members who voted against the Powell amendment and against the amended bill in 1956 and who then voted on the motion to strike the enacting clause in 1957. This group was not, on the whole, supportive of aid to education: 84% voted for the motion to strike the enacting clause. Using this group of 116, I estimate a probit model of the vote decision on the motion to strike in 1957. The dependent variable is the vote on the motion to strike, and the independent variables are a dummy variable for party and the first NOMINATE dimension, which corresponds to a liberal/conservative dimension.<sup>14</sup> Both party and the Lib/Con NOMINATE score are statistically significant.<sup>15</sup> Taking an estimated probability of greater than .65 as a vote for the motion to strike, and lower estimates as votes against, I find that the model predicts 87% of cases correctly.<sup>16</sup>

To extrapolate from the 116 members who voted in 1957 to the 13 who did not, I used the coefficients from the model to estimate the probability that the 13 nonvoters would have voted to strike the enacting clause in 1957. Assuming again that members with estimated probabilities below .65 voted against the motion to strike and in favor of aid to education, I find the model predicts that only 2 of the 13 nonvoters would have voted against the motion to strike the enacting clause. Presumably, they would also have voted for aid to education in 1956 had there been no Powell amendment. But these two votes are not enough to give the bill a victory. The 3 nonvoters most likely to support aid to education had estimated probabilities of voting to kill the bill of .409, .564, and .673 (the lower the estimated probability, the more likely a member was to support aid to education). Even assuming that 3 of the 13 nonvoting members would have voted for aid to education without the Powell amendment, the bill still falls short one vote, failing on a tie.

There is no evidence, apart from faith or hope, on which to base an argument that a voting cycle occurred in 1956. There is, however, evidence against a voting cycle. If one judges from observed votes in 1956 and 1957, one finds there was a majority against the bill. Evidence also points to the conclusion that leaving out the members who did not vote in 1957 does not bias the results. It is impossible to rule out completely the possibility that there was a voting cycle, since we can never know for sure how those 13 members would have voted without the Powell amendment. But neither is there, nor can there be, any convincing evidence of a voting cycle.

### Conclusion

We may reasonably conclude that there was no voting cycle because the status quo would have beaten the original bill in a direct comparison. The Powell amendment was not a “killer amendment,” and its adoption was not responsible for the defeat of the aid to education bill. Neither clever Republican strategy nor Democratic obtuseness determined the result. The aid to education bill died because a majority was opposed to it, with or without the Powell amendment.

It would be nice to conclude this somewhat tedious demonstration with an uplifting moral. Unfortunately, I have none. Many distinguished scholars have fallen victim to a myth about the Powell amendment—largely because of sloppy research and excessive credulity. They have accepted this story largely, I think, because in its conventional telling the Powell amendment saga is irresistibly attractive. We instinctively want to believe it, if only because it is such a marvelous story and teaching tool for students. Yet this is no reason to suspend disbelief or need for proof.

This paper may seem unnecessarily negative, but error correction is an essential element of any scientific or quasi-scientific endeavor. The failure to correct error leads to its repetition and compounding. As Mark Twain said, “It ain’t the things you don’t know that hurt you, it’s the things you know that ain’t so.” In its usual telling, the Powell amendment story ain’t so.

The purported instability of majority rule is an important concept in contemporary political science, although of uncertain practical significance. The theoretical and normative implications of the instability of majority rule have been carefully developed, but its actual applicability is more a matter of faith than of demonstration. Empirical research, such as this paper, Green and Shapiro’s study on the Seventeenth Amendment to the Constitution, and Wilkerson’s (1999) study on killer amendments, has tended to undermine the notion that majority rule is unstable and readily susceptible to manipulation. The Powell amendment has long occupied an important place in political science as the leading example of a voting cycle and, thus, of majority instability. Without the Powell amendment, there is an alarming shortage of documented instances of voting cycles; and examples are needed to anchor theoretical work in the reality of political life.

I move that we table the Powell amendment. Is there objection?

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## NOTES

I would like to thank Don Green, Joe White, Keith Krehbiel, Ray Wolfinger, and Bill Hixon, who provided useful advice. An anonymous referee also provided very helpful comments, as did Steve Smith.

1. Neufeld, Hausman, and Rapoport (1994) have discovered what may be a new voting cycle. It concerns voting in Congress on the Muscle Shoals project of the TVA in the 1930s. But even if this is a genuine instance of a voting cycle, it is of insufficient substantive importance, and too remote in time, to provide an adequate substitute for the Powell amendment.

2. Krehbiel and Rivers (1990) do not subscribe to the conventional wisdom about the Powell amendment and contend that sophisticated voting did not occur.

3. For an interesting discussion of the strategy behind the Powell amendment, see Hamilton 1991, 223-35.

4. In the 1950s, all amending activity normally took place in the Committee of the Whole, as it still does. Teller rather than electronic voting was used then, and while it provided an accurate count of the yeas and nays, it did not record how individual members voted. After the Committee of the Whole reported a bill to the House, successful amendments in the Committee of the Whole were subject to a recorded vote in the House itself.

5. See Sundquist 1968, 165-68, for a summary of contemporaneous reactions.

6. Bendner (1964, 135) reports that the amendment passed "with many Southern members, as in 1956, absenting themselves. In fact, if only half their absentees had turned out for the vote, they could have defeated the amendment then and there. But it was shrewder to leave it in, the better to beat the bill itself on the final vote—or at worst to doom it to a filibuster in the Senate." This interesting tactic by the Southerners has gone entirely undiscussed in the extensive Powell amendment literature. Why would Southerners use this stratagem to defeat the bill rather than simply vote against the bill on final passage? A possible answer would be that they were under substantial pressure from the Democratic leadership and would have preferred a good excuse to vote against the education bill.

7. For an extended discussion of tactics of this kind, see Gilmour 1995.

8. Those 10 states were Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.

9. Seven of the nine Southern supporters of aid to education were from Alabama. The other two were from Arkansas.

10. William Colmer (D-MS) provided an interesting rationale for Southern opposition to the bill, apart from simple conservatism. He argued that even if the Powell/Wainwright amendment were defeated, segregated school districts would receive no money. The Powell amendment, he argued "will be offered as an amendment on an appropriation bill. If that is not done, it will be done administratively. If that is not done, is there anybody so naive as to believe that the Supreme Court that said you could not have segregated schools is going to permit you to receive Federal money and have segregated schools? . . . In the final analysis your States would be taxed to build schools in other States without receiving any of the benefits" (*Congressional Record* 1957, 12738).

11. Riker includes members who were paired for and against. I will follow that practice.

12. Taken as a group, the nonvoters were somewhat more likely than the rest of the House to vote for the Powell amendment (58% of them voting for Powell in 1956 compared with 54% of the whole House). As a group, they were also somewhat less likely to vote for the bill on final passage (40% voting for final passage compared to 46% of the whole House). Also, they were slightly more Republican than the whole House (51% compared to 54%).

13. The thirteen were: Priest (D-TN), Wickersham (D-OK), Deane (D-NC), Love (R-SD), Wolcott (R-MI), Richards (D-SC), Dondero (R-MI), Carlyle (D-NC), Chatham (D-NC), Gentry (D-TX), W. Jones (D-NC), Boykin (D-AL), and Bell (D-TX).

14. Professor Keith Poole of Carnegie-Mellon University has generously made NOMINATE data available to the research community through his website: <http://voteview.uh.edu/>.

15. The dependent variable is the motion to strike, with yeas coded 1 and nays 0. Party is coded 1 for Democrats and 0 for Republicans. For the Lib/Con NOMINATE score, a lower number represents a more liberal position. Results are as follows:

Variable	Estimate	Standard Error	T-Statistic
Constant	-1.03210	0.56530	-1.8257
Lib/Con Party	5.00651	1.43108	3.4984
	2.61121	0.74602	3.5002
N: 116			
Chi Squared: 18.570 with 2 Degrees of Freedom			
Log Likelihood: -40.7781			

I also estimated the model with four independent variables, using those above but also including a dummy variable for members from Southern states and the civil rights NOMINATE score. I deleted the Southern and civil rights variables in the final analysis because they were insignificant and results were unaffected by their exclusion.

16. The seemingly arbitrary threshold of .65 was chosen because it minimized classification errors. Of members with estimated probabilities above .65, 92 of 101 (91%) voted for the motion to strike. Of the members with probabilities below .65, 9 of 15 (60%) voted against the motion to strike.

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